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ABSTRACT 
 
With the ongoing change in focus from regulatory capital to economic capital comes a 
need to reassess banks current practice in disposing of the equity toxic waste produced as 
a by-product in the asset-backed securitisation process. Financial innovation coupled with 
the speed of  change  in financial markets and the sheer complexity  of some financial 
transactions  poses  real  difficulties  for  supervisors  and  regulators  in  this  context.  The 
development of risk-based regulation will undoubtedly result in compliance with the form 
of the new Basle II regulatory requirements. However, risk-based regulation in itself will 
not ensure that banks treat equity toxic waste in a way that is wholly compliant with the 
substance of the new Basle regulations. In the UK life assurance sector the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) has been moving in the direction of embedding the concept of 
"a compliant competent organization" into the industry. This paper argues for a similar 
approach for financial entities engaged in asset-backed securitisation. 
 
 
 
 
This paper was presented at an ISF seminar at Essex University in February 2003. 
Any errors are the responsibility of the author alone.   3 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Asset-Backed Securitisation may be broadly defined as ‘the process whereby like types of 
financial assets are pooled together, with their cash flows or economic values redirected to 
support payments on related securities. These securities, generally referred to as ‘asset-
backed securities’ are issued and sold to investors – principally institutions – in the public 
and private markets by or on behalf of issuers, who utilise securitisation to finance their 
business activities’
1 
 
The market for securitisation has been growing dramatically over the last decade or so, 
with new issuance of European securitised debt totalling ¼ELOOLRQLQXSIURP
¼ELOOLRQLQ
2  Whereas, the Eurobond market for corporate debt (including 
securitised debt) exceeded ¼WULOOLRQLQ7KHSLFWXUHLVPRUHGUDPDWLFLQWKH86
where securitised debt (including mortgage backed debt) outstanding made up 30% of the 
total public and private bond market. Outstanding US corporate debt made up just 20% of 
the total  ($18.6  trillion)  market in  2001.
3  Propelling  the  growth  in  securitisation  is  a 
continuous evolution of the types of issuers and the specific asset classes supporting the 
transactions. 
 
Toxic waste is by definition a highly risky substance that should be treated with due care 
and attention. Equally, this is the case with Equity Toxic Waste (ETW). When banks 
engage in the asset-backed securitisation process they sell (transfer) a pool of assets and 
their associated risk to a special purpose vechicle (SPV). The SPV issues securities that 
are backed by this pool of assets in the capital market. Almost always the SPV will 
employ tranching by issuing a mix of high and low credit rated securities.
4 The senior 
tranche will be investment grade and these securities will be supported by mezzanine 
tranches, which in turn are supported by unrated subordinated equity tranches. All of the 
securities bar the equity tranche are sold. The equity tranche is typically retained by the 
originating bank and held on balance sheet. This equity tranche is what is referred to as 
                                                 
1 European Securitisation Forum, A Resource Guide (1999). 
2 Source European Securitisation Forum 2003. 
3 The Bond Market Association 2003. 
4 Tranching describes the process used in portfolio instruments and transactions to re-engineer the 
risk/return profile of a pool of assets or credit risk exposures into multiple risk classes with different degrees 
of seniority in bankruptcy and timing of default (Committee on the Global Financial System, 2003).   4 
Equity Toxic Waste throughout this paper. What the originating bank decides to do with 
an equity tranche is of importance to bank managers and regulators.
5 
 
This paper is organized as follows. The first section provides a definition of equity toxic 
waste  and  analyses  current  practice  by  banks  in  its  disposal.  Section  2  reviews  the 
regulatory  framework  for  securitisation  and  current  proposals  for  its  treatment  under 
Basel  II.  Section  3  analyses  the  potential  for  a  qualitative  approach  to  capital 
requirements for toxic waste disposal that draws from recent developments in insurance 
regulation. The final section offers concluding remarks. 
 
 
2.  EQUITY TOXIC WASTE 
 
“Asset Backed Securitisation (ABS) is one of the most important and abiding innovations 
to emerge in financial markets since the 1930’s” (Kendall and Fishman, 1996).  ABS is 
defined as a financing technique in which “a company or financial institution dedicates 
the  cash  flows  from  selected  assets  to  securing  certain  liabilities  and  then  creates 
securities from those liabilities” (Giddy, 1994). ABS can also be described as the process 
of transforming illiquid assets into marketable securities, hence raising liquidity. It is a 
financing  technique  widely  employed  by  international  financial  institutions  and 
increasingly by the corporate sector, and governments. 
 
Motives for securitisation: 
There  are  a  number  of  perceived  reasons  for  securitising  assets,  but  these  can  be 
segregated into two broad categories, (i) as a means of enhancing performance and (ii) a 
form  of  risk  management  and  balance  sheet  structuring.  In  respect  to  the  early 
evolutionary stages of ABS development, the drive by banks to securitise was led by the 
desire to remove assets off their balance sheet, in an attempt to gain a more efficient use 
of capital, while in the process of transferring risks to investors. Pavel and Phillis (1987), 
as well as Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) suggested that securitising provide banks with 
an alternative method of reducing risk, diversifying portfolios, and funding both their 
                                                 
5 Note that the term ’equity tranche’ is not equity but unrated debt. The term is used because this unrated 
debt acts as a buffer stock supporting the senior debt in an asset-backed securitisation (i.e. it plays a similar 
role to that of the equity of a bank).   5 
operations  and  new  assets.  Furthermore,  Lockwood,  et  al  (1996)  highlight  instances 
where such innovations lead to wealth effects for the shareholders of the issuing firm. 
 
Securitisation provides an alternative and additional scope for traditional intermediation, 
and this can be observed by briefly examining the securitisation process. Typically, the 
originating institution forms a separate special purpose, bankruptcy-remote securitisation 
conduit, the SPV, by providing the initial set of capital. The SPV then purchase part of the 
originating bank’s loan portfolio, or in some cases may even originate loans itself. To 
finance its portfolio, the conduit issues a varied set of asset backed market instruments – 
usually floating rate notes (FRNs)
6 – collateralised by the underlying loan pool (See Chart 
1).  A major portion of the SPV’s debt is issued to investors, who for a variety of reasons 
e.g.  institutional  investors,  generally  require  the  senior  securities  to  be  highly  rated 
investment grade (triple or double A).  
 
Chart 1  The Asset Backed Securitisation Process 
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6 These are usually linked to some reference rate (i.e. Libor) offering this rate plus a premium spread. 
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In order to produce highly rated tranches, the SPV must receive credit enhancements that 
insulate  the  senior  securities  from  the  risk  of  default  on  the  underlying  portfolio.  
Typically, the originating bank provide the bulk of the enhancements which can take 
many forms, ranging from issuing standby letters of credit to the SPV, to repurchasing the 
most junior securities issued by the SPV. 
 
Many investors are drawn to these high yielding securities as opposed to those of similar 
credit  quality,  e.g.  corporate  and  emerging  market  bonds.  They  offer  higher  yields 
because of a possible prepayment risk, and a liquidity premium due to an underdeveloped 
European secondary market (see Ward and Wolfe (2003)). The originating bank not only 
benefits from capital relief, but they also secure origination, servicing and monitoring 
fees. In addition, they receive the residual spread between the yields on the loan portfolio, 
and the adjusted interest costs of the conduit, which are all secured by various methods of 
profit extraction. 
 
In a securitisation transaction structure, the securities issued by the SPV are usually rated 
with  ratings  ranging  from  AAA  rated  debt  to  unrated  debt.  The  senior  rated  debt 
comprises  the  bulk  of  the  issue  with  a  minimal  amount  constituting  the 
speculative/unrated  debt.  The  unrated  debt  component  is  often  termed  the  ‘equity’ 
tranche. This is not actually equity, but since it is the most risky tranche of the deal it is 
often referred to as the ‘equity’ tranche, or less formally as the toxic tranche, since all the 
default risk from the whole issue effectively leaches down into this bottom tranche. Thus, 
most  systemic  risks  in  a  securitisation  are  absorbed  by  the  excess  spread  of  the 
securitisation and the originator’s equity/first-loss loan (see Chart 2). 
 
In  a  securitisation  transaction  the  equity  tranche  is  the  unrated  debt  component  as 
depicted in chart 2. Equity investors (originating bank) hope to achieve a geared return 
between after default yield on assets and the financing cost of the mezzanine and senior 
tranches. The size of the equity tranche in a typical securitisation has fallen over the past 
number of years. In the mid-1990s the equity tranche retained by the originating bank 
averaged approxamitly 7% of the capital structure. However, as the market deepened and 
investor appetite grew, more and more of the junior debt was sold. Today approximately   7 
1%  of  the  capital  structure  is  retained  as  the  equity  tranche  by  originating  banks.
7 
However,  other  sources  estimate  this  level  to  be  higher  in  the  range  2%  to  15% 
(Committee on the Global Financial System, 2003).  
 
 
CHART 2: Portfolio Funding 
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Under  the  present  regulatory  capital  requirements  the  equity  tranche  retained  by  the 
originating  bank  and  held  on-balance  sheet  will  attract  a  dollar-for-dollar  capital 
requirement (i.e. deducted from capital). This gives rise to a desire by banks to dispose of 
this tranche in some other way. There are a number of complex financial transactions that 
a bank can conduct to achieve disposal. However, in some cases these transactions are 
constructed not to reduce risk but to transform the equity tranche into an instrument that 
                                                 
7  1% was cited by a number of speakers (market practitioners) at the Asset Backed Summit, Geneva, 2002. 
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attracts a lower capital requirement. The first example of two such masking transaction is 
depicted in Chart 3. 
 
CHART 3: The TRS method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Keighley (2002).
8 
 
This method of selling the equity tranche, but which creates concerns about the real risk 
transfer, consists of a total return swap. Grossly oversimplified, the originating bank sells 
the toxic waste to a third party, usually an investment bank, who in turn effects a total 
return swap  with  the  originating  bank. Typically,  a pre-arranged understanding exists 
between the two banks. This understanding is that the investment bank buys the toxic 
waste  from  the  originating  bank  on  condition  that  it  can  send  the  risk  back  to  the 
originator via a total return swap. The end result in such a complex transaction is that the 
equity tranche through the swap returns to the originating bank. What the originator has 
effectively managed to do is exchange the high capital charge associated with the equity 
tranche for a lower capital charge associated with the swap (which is held on-balance 
sheet by the bank). The swap would mask the true nature of the equity toxic waste from 
                                                 
8 Charts 3, 4, and 5 were presented by Jonathan Keighley (Structured Finance Management Ltd.) at the 
ABSummit 2002 in Geneva, April. 
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regulatory supervisors. Regulators do not approve of such transactions as the concept of 
real risk transfer does not apply. 
 
A second method of disposing of the toxic waste is depicted in Chart 4. However, in this 
example as in the previous one - no risk is removed. A transformation takes place through 
an  elaborate  set of complex financial transactions. The  originating bank undertakes a 
securitisation and instead of retaining the toxic waste it arranges for another investment 
bank to buy it. The investment bank through a credit default swap passes the toxic waste 
to a special purpose firm. The special purpose firm may utilize a currency swap (perhaps 
to throw supervisors off the trail) and then issues a credit linked note in the new currency 
to an affiliate of the originating bank. The risk of the equity toxic waste has just gone 
around in a large circle and re-entered the bank through the back door as an instrument 
attracting a lower capital charge (100% as opposed to 1250%).
9 
 
CHART 4: METAMORPHOSIS 
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Regulators, have to be alert for such type of transactions that create serious implications 
for  the  banking  community  and  the  financial  markets.  Banks  on  their  part  although 
inevitably  always  aiming  at  achieving  higher  returns,  carry  an  obligation  towards 
shareholders, depositors and society at large. The risk-return trade off analysis performed 
by  banks  will  show  that  any  defaults  occurring  from  such  transactions  bring  about 
negative repercussions. The concept of real risk transfer brings about a fairer distribution 
of capital allocation representing realistically the risks involved in securitisation. 
 
The  real  risk-transfer  objective  depends  upon  further  development  of  the  unrated 
/speculative debt market. As in all transactions, for every originating bank trying to sell 
an equity tranche a counterparty must be willing to purchase the tranche. In the market, 
one finds funds specialising in speculative debt and who are prepared to purchase such 
debt. The equity tranche can also be sold to some Commercial Paper Conduits who are 
permitted to invest in unrated assets. However, direct sale of the equity tranche is difficult 
due to information asymmetries on the underlying portfolio performance. At present no 
information is available beyond the offering circular provided to potential investors prior 
to issuance. Post issuance performance is neither provided by originators nor by SPVs in 
the European ABS market.
10 
 
There  is an  approved  method of sanitising the toxic  waste and  removing it from the 
bank’s balance sheet (see Chart 5). Sale of the equity tranche can be effected through a 
securitisation process involving the originating bank. If, as an example, the bank has a 1% 
equity tranche retained on its balance sheet after a securitisation transaction, the bank can 
create a new SPV separate from the original one used in the securitisation structure. The 
1% equity tranche is filtered through the new SPV together with another 99% of zero 
coupon government bonds rated at investment grade. Being filtered through the SPV the 
equity tranche plus the bonds will result in new securities (AA through to BBB rated) that 
are  sold  in  the  capital  market  to  third  party  investors.  Although  such  a  sanitisation 
structure may be expensive to set up initially, through repeated transactions of the same 
kind the process may become economically viable creating benefits for the originating 
banks. 
                                                                                                                                                   
9 If an asset is deducted from capital this means that for every pound in value one pound must be held as 
capital. A100% capital requirement means that 8% of the asset value must be held as capital. On this basis a 
1250% capital requirement means that 100% of the value of the asset must be held as capital.   11 
 
 
CHART 5: AN APPROVED METHOD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Keighley (2002). 
                                                                                                                                                   
10 This is an ongoing issue. See the European Securitisation Forum (1999). 
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3.  CAPITAL REGULATIONS 
 
There  is  a  dynamic  connection  between  market  innovation  and  regulation.  Financial 
innovation often occurs in response to regulation, especially when regulation makes little 
economic sense (Meyer, 1998). Economic efficiencies that are potentially associated with 
financial innovation can be negated by inefficient banking regulation. As regulation is 
perceived to hinder this process, new variants of financial products would come to the 
fore. Conversely, advances in the market spur the evolution of regulation. Investment 
opportunities  may  originate  in  the  private  sector,  where  the  rate  of  return  on  the 
investment  is  paramount,  as  opposed  to  the  public  sector  where  social  returns  is 
promoted. Therefore regulation must somehow produce a fine balance between these two 
positions. 
 
The usefulness of the 1988 capital adequacy accord lies with its ability to be used as a 
benchmark for financial scrutiny by both regulators and counterparties alike. However, 
increasing  levels  of  financial  innovations  undermine  the  effectiveness  of  the  capital 
adequacy  requirements.  With  the  proliferation  of  capital  arbitrage
11  techniques, 
securitisation included, banks can effectively achieve risk based capital ratios, which are 
below  the  Accord’s  nominal  8%.  Capital  arbitrage  is  fundamentally  driven  by  large 
divergences between economic risks and that of the risk weighted measure set by the 
BIS.
12 This in addition to its efficiencies can also give rise to distorted risk management 
techniques, and from a safety and soundness perspective, risk management distortions 
could be as, or even more problematic than capital arbitrage. 
 
By  contrast,  efficient  banking  regulation  not  only  provides  a  backdrop  for  financial 
advances, but also permits governments to achieve to some extent social objectives which 
otherwise may have been impossible or incurred at a higher cost. With the 1988 Accord, 
the phenomenon of capital arbitrage poses some significant policy tradeoffs, for the only 
means available to regulators in limiting such activity is through the imposition of broad 
                                                 
11 Defined by Jones (1999) as activities that permit a bank to assume greater risk with no increase in its 
minimum regulatory capital requirement, while at the same time showing no change or possibly an increase 
in its capital ratios. 
12 Jones (2000) states: “…capital arbitrage has attracted scant academic attention. In part, the lack of 
published research no doubt reflects the scarcity of public data  …” and   “….may also reflect the 
complexity of the underlying transactions.”   13 
restrictions on the use of financial engineering technologies. According to Jones (1999), 
this would however be counterproductive and possibly untenable since capital arbitrage 
often functions as a safety valve for mitigating the adverse effects of nominal capital 
requirements that, for some activities are unreasonably high. Capital arbitrage permits 
banks to compete in some activities that they would have been forced to abandon due to 
insufficient returns on regulatory capital needed.  Moreover, securitisation and other risk 
unbundling techniques to some extent appear to provide significant economic benefits 
apart from capital arbitrage. 
 
The  debate  in  many  instances  focuses  on  whether  inefficient  or  burdensome  capital 
adequacy  requirements  can  reduce  the  risks  in  banking.    According  to  Blum  (1999) 
“under  binding  capital  requirements  an  additional  unit  of  equity  tomorrow  is  more 
valuable to a bank. If raising equity is excessively costly, the only possibility to increase 
equity tomorrow is to increase risk today.” Importantly, Gehrig (1995) highlighted that 
capital requirements greatly influence the nature of strategic competition among banks. 
Essentially,  it  must  be  noted  that  in  a  dynamic  setting,  with  incentives  for  asset 
substitution, capital adequacy may actually lead to increases in bank risks. Furthermore, if 
the regulators are concerned with reducing the insolvency risk of banks, then one of the 
effects of such regulation is reduced bank profit. Theoretically, with lower profits, a bank 
has a smaller incentive to avoid default, along with the ‘leverage effect of capital rules’, 
raises the value of equity to the bank.  For with every dollar of equity, more than one 
dollar can be invested in a profitable, but risky asset. 
 
The 1988 Basle accord is extremely simplistic in terms of credit risk with banks having to 
contend with a rather arbitrary capital requirement of 8%.  Though many of the internal 
capital allocation procedures have evolved as credit products have evolved. Regulatory 
requirements for capital have been oversimplified historically and tend to penalise those 
institutions  that  invest  in  sophisticated  internal  risk  management  systems.  Regulatory 
concerns about capital adequacy therefore can best be addressed by allowing qualifying 
institutions to use their own risk models for determining capital adequacy for credit and 
market risks, subject to regulatory oversight. This policy can promote innovation, as well 
as  financial  market  soundness  and  a  more  efficient  allocation  of  capital.  Currently, 
regulatory capital rules do not fully capture the economic substance of the risk exposures 
arising from asset-backed securitisations.    14 
BIS 1999 Proposals 
The  BIS,  though  achieving  competitive  equality  to  some  extent,  has  recognised  the 
weaknesses in the existing Accord, and issued new proposals in June 1999 for initial 
consultation aimed at more ‘definitive’ proposals in 2001. The review of the Accord is 
designed to improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks. It is 
also designed to better address the financial innovation that has occurred in recent years 
(Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision,  1999).  Innovations  such  as  structured 
securitisations have made the current Accord - a crude risk measure - less effective in 
calibrating an institution’s true risk profile. The proposed capital framework consists of 
three ‘pillars’: minimum regulatory capital requirements, a supervisory review process 
and  effective  use  of  market  discipline.  However,  the  scope  of  this  section  is  not  to 
examine  the  entire  set  of  proposals  but  those  particularly  pertaining  to  securitising 
activity. 
 
According  to  the  2003  report  on  credit  risk  transfer,  the  Committee  recognises  that 
securitising  serves  as  an  effective  and  efficient  method  of  redistributing  risks  and 
diversifying  portfolios.
13  The  concern  however  occurs  with  the  use  of  structured 
securitisations at avoiding the maintenance of capital consistent with their risk exposures.  
As such, the new proposals seek to re-align the risk weightings of corporate obligors 
commensurate with their respective credit risk. The capital allocated could therefore be 
considered appropriate for the credit risk of individual tranches. High-grade securitised 
paper will now carry a 20% risk weightage, severely reducing the capital requirement to 
one-fifth of the current standard. Securitised products with a rating A- and higher are 
those that have received the greatest level of capital relief. Likewise, those below BBB- 
carry a risk weighting of 150%, a 50% increase in capital adequacy requirements (See 
Table 1). 
 
These  proposals are expected  to  have  profound  effects  on  the  ABS  market.  There  is 
expected to be a boost in demand for high quality securitised products especially for 
banks seeking capital relief, such banks with a conservative risk profile could see their 
capital requirements reduced. There should also be a widening of the gap in prices and 
consequently yields due to newly proposed differences in ratings. For the market as a 
                                                 
13 Committee on the Global Financial System (2003).   15 
whole, the new tiering in capital charges will lead to a more noticeable tiering in spreads 
amongst securities in different risk categories resulting in a steeper credit curve for the 
international ABS market, (Batchvarov et al., 1999). Essentially, there is expected to be 
greater comparability in prices among spread products, and ABS can benefit from greater 
transparency in assessing relative values. 
 
 
TABLE 1: Treatment for Securitisation Structures 
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14 
 
 
The  proposals  also  reward  investors  with  instruments  from  higher  tranches,  and 
effectively penalising those with lower rated ones, thereby pressuring banks to achieve 
the highest level of ratings possible. The scope for structured securitisations should also 
increase, as asset-backed securities can be structured in such a way to achieve desired 
ratings and consequently risk weightings. With the use of internal ratings and greater 
correspondence with rating agencies, this would provide a means of producing cheaper, 
quicker, and easier packaging of assets and further boost the growth in the market. Instead 
of engaging in wide-scale capital arbitrage, banks now have further incentive to structure 
the debt in order to achieve higher-rated credit ratings. 
 
Clearly this would entail a greater level of dependence on external credit rating agencies 
for providing capital charges for securitisations,  as they are  even more dependent  on 
provided credit ratings. Implementation of such a proposal could drastically narrow the 
gap between the current ‘crude’ capital charges and the economic capital banks allocate 
internally. Potentially, this could also provide investors with exposure to high quality 
                                                 
14 Credit enhancements will also be deducted from capital..Source: BIS (2001).   16 
European corporate borrowers through CLO type securitisations,
15 because they have no 
public rating, which would otherwise be barred to them. Rating agencies will effectively 
become part of the regulatory mechanism for the financial sector. 
 
Clearly, the provision of 150% on lower rated securities represents a step in the right 
direction, but if in these securitisation transactions, these bonds bear the majority of the 
risk  of  the  higher  tranches,  then  the  capital  charge  should  therefore  be  substantially 
higher. Furthermore, a large portion of these investments are retained by the originator 
and as such the originator has still not relinquished some portion of risk associated with 
the securitisation transaction.  Furthermore, the bands among the levels of ratings in the 
new proposals are also broad and wide-ranging and can possibly lead to capital arbitrage.  
Finally, banks must ‘get up to speed’ quickly with their systems which would enable them 
to investigate the possible benefits and drawbacks of the proposed framework on their 
operations. Likewise, the rating agencies must also determine how the increased demands 
of ratings will affect the efficiency and quality of their output, thus possibly fuelling the 
tensions among regulators, bankers and the rating agencies. 
 
The adoption of portfolio management principles in the banking sector has led to banks 
originating transactions in which they have a distinct comparative advantage. Assets held 
by the bank are traded in a bid to achieve a balanced asset portfolio. By retaining such a 
balanced  portfolio  the  bank  is  better  equipped  to  diversify  risk  reducing  the  EC 
requirements due to correlations and concentrations. Through securitisation a reduction in 
EC may be attained by reducing exposures in areas where a bank is concentrated (for 
example, in a particular industry or specific lending sector). Portfolio selection is thus 
more targeted towards specific targets as set by management. Aiding in this quest for 
diversification is the ever- expanding growth of synthetic securitisations where the credit 
risk  and  not  the  assets  are  sold  through,  for  example,  credit  derivatives.  Capital 
requirements held against synthetics have to be set in an equitable manner as not to hinder 
the development of such a market. 
 
The  Portfolio  Management  objective  leads  towards  a  strategic  securitisation  strategy 
adopted by banking institutions that are trying to improve their return on EC. Srategic 
                                                 
15 CLO  (Collateralized Loan Obligations) transactions are the securitisation of corporate loans by banks.    17 
securitisation  ensures  that  originators  and  investors  balance  their  asset  portfolio 
efficiently, with resources (principally capital) being consumed efficiently. Which assets 
the bank originates well, and which assets the bank wishes to hold, are questions that 
strategic securitisation may address in an effective manner. 
 
The contrast between the prime securitisation objective under the Accord, i.e., regulatory 
capital arbitrage (RCA) and the risk transfer objective applicable under the New Accord 
is  clearly  marked.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  Advanced  IRB  approach,  permitting 
sophisticated  banks  to  utilise  internal  models  for  risk  assessment,  is  the  approach 
proposed by Basel that mostly mirrors EC assessments. This shift in objectives results in 
banks retaining high-quality assets on their balance sheet instead of securitising them, as 
was custom  under  the Accord to obtain  capital  relief. Through  EC, such arbitrage to 
obtain capital relief is reduced as it is the high-quality assets that are retained and the 
poorer quality assets sold. The necessity to securitise a bank’s riskier assets and to retain 
quality assets on the balance sheet has major implications for equity toxic waste. The 
implications  are  that  securitised  asset  pools  will  in  future  be  of  poorer  quality.  This 
suggests that the equity tranche will need to be greater in order to provide support for the 
senior  debt.  As  banks  retain  larger  and  larger  equity  tranches  the  need  will  grow  to 
dispose of them and thereby potentially compounding the problem of masking. 
 
ASSESSMENT 
The new Basel capital proposals, to come into force in 2007, provide a framework within 
which securitisation is more comprehensively covered than under the old Accord. The 
new requirements take into account the perspectives of both originators and third parties 
as investers in asset-backed instruments. A clearer linkage has been made between the 
economic risks of both tranches and credit enhancements and capital weights. A clear 
identification of recourse risk (liquidity risk) to originators is highlighted and also is the 
danger of a future potential shift away from credit risk to operational risk (legal risk) in 
asset-backed securitisations. Even though the new rules are quantitative there will also be 
a  role  for  qualitative  regulation  when  setting  capital  requirements  for  asset  backed 
activity.
16 However, room still exists for capital arbitrage to take place between the new 
bands  and  potential  exists  for  banks  to  mask  equity  toxic  waste  through  innovative 
                                                 
16 This point is also made by the Committee on the Global Financial System (2003), p.28.   18 
disposal techniques. Squaring this final circle will require a cultural shift by banks to one 
of facing up to economic risks and their danger for a financial institution. 
 
 
 
4. CULTURAL SHIFT TO EMBRACE FULLY ECONOMIC RISKS 
 
 
The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 builds upon the existing compliance culture 
first introduced in the Financial Services Act 1986. “If compliance is a matter of getting 
by,  keeping  the  regulator  off  the  firm’s  back,  or  keeping  the  regulator  happy,  then 
compliance  is  in  a  pretty  fragile  state”  Jackman  (2001).  He  argues  for  a  partnership 
approach to compliance between the regulator and the regulated as opposed to a more 
prescriptive  approach.  The  partnership  approach  would  be  based  on  a  light  touch 
approach from the regulator and an open and proactive approach to issues of compliance 
and  competence  (supported  by  appropriate  corporate  values  and  culture)  from  the 
regulated entity. 
 
By fostering a partnership approach between the regulator and the regulated the Financial 
Services  Authority  (FSA)  aims  to  establish  Compliance  Competent  Organisations 
(CCOs).  Edwards  (2003)  argues  that  “the  new  partnership  approach  to  establishing 
sustainable  CCOs,  as  outlined  by  Jackman  (2001)  is  supported  by  academic  theory, 
practitioner input, the regulator and the regulated”. 
 
Mechanical compliance has done little to prevent problems in the past, often with serious 
repercussions for those affected. The FSA regulatory approach is based on ethical values 
and the Authority seeks to promote ethical behaviour for the financial services industry 
(FSA, 2002). What is envisaged is a major shift in the compliance culture of the financial 
services industry. In relation to equity toxic waste disposal – this new approach would 
result in banks facing up to the economic risks posed by any financial transaction and 
more fully complying with the spirit and not just the letter of regulatory rules.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
As  innovative  financial  transactions  become  ever  more  complex  the  task  of  tracking 
economic risks will become more and more difficult for supervisors. Supervisors have 
finite  resources  and  therefore  it  seems  logical  that  they  enter  into  partnership 
arrangements with banks to ensure compliance with the spirit as well as the letter of 
financial regulations.
17 In many cases a quantitative approach to capital requirements is 
sufficient, however, in other cases a qualitative approach will be necessary. Banks need to 
fully  embrace  economic  risk  and  not  be  tempted  to  mask  risks  through  complex 
transactions. This requires a cultural change to one of compliant competence throughout 
the whole banking entity. 
 
                                                 
17 Dale and Wolfe (2003) highlight the pressures that the FSA face in demonstrating benefits of a single 
regulator as reduced cost of regulation.    20 
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